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I   INTRODUCTION  
 
Biblical law is foundational to Western law and civilisation. This makes its inclusion in a 
research handbook on law and religion necessary. At the same time, the modern world is 
constructed in such a way that we do not engage with the Bible, or biblical law, seriously. 
This makes its inclusion in the present handbook vital. Yet we do not have to go back very far 
to discover evidence of substantial knowledge of, and dialogue with, biblical law amongst 
philosophers.1 Such is the case with the leading English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-
1832).2  Modern readers would hardly know of this because Bentham’s interest in biblical law 
is not discussed in secondary literature.3 Yet his writings disclose substantial engagement with 
the subject. This chapter explores Bentham’s engagement with the authority of biblical law.  
                                                 
*  I am grateful to Prof Nicholas Aroney (Queensland), Prof Bernard Jackson (Manchester) 
and Prof Julian Rivers (Bristol), as well as an anonymous reviewer for this volume, for their 
responses to an earlier draft of this paper. The usual disclaimers apply. Biblical quotations are 
drawn from the English Standard Version (ESV) translation of the Holy Bible.   
1 Yoram Hazony, The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2012).  
2 Bentham’s detailed knowledge of biblical law is seen in his reference to biblical legal 
practices such as those of ‘grasping the horns of the altar’ (eg 1 Kings 1:50, 2:28) rending the 
clothes and crying blasphemy (Matt 26:65; Mark 14:63-64); A Comment on the 
Commentaries and A Fragment of Government (J H Burns and HLA Hart (eds); Athlone, 
University of London, 1977) 21.      
3 The only example I have found is David Baumgardt, Bentham and the Ethics of Today 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952) 98-105, although Baumgardt makes no attempt 
to subject Bentham’s claims to critical scrutiny. 
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The authority of biblical law is especially problematic in a modern context. Of course, 
all law must deal with the problem of heteronomy, viz, the existence of authority outside our 
wills to which we ought to defer. It demands we lay aside our independent moral authority.4 
In practice we are happy to surrender this in deference to certain forms of authority, such as 
scientific authority. 5  We may also be content to do so in regard to laws we think are 
legitimate. But it goes against the grain to surrender it to divine authority.6 Of course, matters 
are more complicated than this and, certainly, biblical law does not know of any such blind 
submission.7 But we are talking about modern perceptions—and few have shaped these more 
than Bentham. For all his faults, 8  Bentham is credited with giving a new foundation to 
classical liberalism9 and is said to reflect ‘some of the important assumptions, values and 
prejudices that have gone into the composition of the modern Western civilisation.’10 It is his 
perspective that is implicit in the ideal of modern law which affects our whole culture and 
which even affects our idea of rationality.   
In Bentham, then, we have a discussant who both embodies modernity and who 
addresses perhaps the most contentious aspect of biblical law, namely its authority.11 Indeed, 
                                                 
4 HLA Hart, Essays on Bentham (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982) 253 and see further 
the discussion in Joseph Raz (1985) 14 Phil & Public Affairs 3. 
5 I may not understand quantum mechanics but I respect the authority and status of physicists 
who tell me what quantum mechanics is.   
6 The assertion of ‘scientific truth’ to the detriment of other claims to truth including, most of 
all, ‘religious truth’ is a matter of social construction.   
7 Torah is not given at Sinai as a series of arbitrary injunctions, nor is it received in a spirit of 
submissive discipline. Rather, it is given by a beloved creator and received by collective and 
popular acclamation (Exodus 19:8). The people agree to take part in a universalist project – to 
be ‘a kingdom of priests and a holy nation’ (Exodus 19:6) – a task that ‘must be undertaken 
with cooperation and free initiative’ (Joshua Weinstein, ‘Between normativity and givenness,’ 
unpublished paper delivered at Templeton Conference on Torah From Heaven, 21 June 
2017).  
8 Still one of the best all-round critiques of Bentham is given by William Whewell in his 
Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (1862), reprinted as ‘Bentham’ in Bhikhu 
Parekh (ed), Jeremy Bentham: Ten Critical Essays (London, Frank Cass, 1974) 41-61.    
9 Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Introduction’ in Bhikhu Parekh (ed), Bentham’s Political Thought (London, 
Croom Helm, 1973) 13, 44.  
10 Parekh, ‘Introduction’ in Parekh, Jeremy Bentham, vii - xxvii, vii.   
11 ‘Law’ in the Bible is not presented as being any more or less authoritative than, say, the 
genres of wisdom, poetry or narrative also found in the Bible–on the contrary, all Scripture is 
presented as the living Word of God (eg Matthew 4:4; 22:31 and 2 Timothy 3:16). 
Nevertheless, to our ears, biblical law strikes us as emphatically authoritative, at least in terms 
of its ‘tone and intent’ (Nicholas Aroney, ‘Divine law, religious ethics, secular reason’ (2013) 
14 Political Theology 670). Much could, of course, be said about how the Bible understands 
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the rise of modernity and the problematizing of the authority of biblical law are deeply 
connected. This chapter examines Bentham’s idea of biblical law and his reasons for rejecting 
its authority. These are worth exploring, for several reasons. First, they are the views of a 
leading legal positivist whose beliefs have shaped ideas of modern law. Not only that, but 
they have even affected our thinking about biblical law as well. Second, Bentham’s views 
anticipate modern denials regarding the authority of biblical law. Third, despite its 
significance no-one, as far as I am aware, has analyzed this material.   
 
II   BENTHAM’S IDEA OF BIBLICAL LAW 
 
Bentham’s discussion of biblical law is set out in A Comment on the Commentaries, written in 
the 1770s but never completed. The incomplete status of some of Bentham’s work is one of 
the challenges with which Benthamite scholarship must contend. At least the Comment saw 
the light of day; more than 180 years after Bentham’s death, much of his work remains 
unpublished.12 Yet the Comment was never abandoned. Dinwiddy tells us that Bentham, aged 
80, added a further 300 sheets of manuscript to his original writings.13 Clearly, the subject 
was an itch that never went away.  
Bentham’s discussion begins with his definition of divine law. He sees ‘[t]he Law of 
Revelation, among Christians’ 14  as ‘divided into two parts: the one containing the Law 
delivered by Moses: the other containing the Law, as it is called, delivered by Jesus and his 
Apostles.’15 We notice at once that Bentham provides us with a secular exposition, from the 
outset. God is not identified as the original source and both bodies of law are said to be 
delivered by human beings (Moses, Jesus and the Apostles). We also notice that whereas 
Moses delivers ‘Law’, Jesus delivers ‘Law, as it is called’ (emphasis added). Distinctions 
within ‘the Law of Revelation’ are thus made on the basis of Bentham’s own philosophy of 
                                                                                                                                                        
its own claims to authority. However, this would take us too far afield of the present project; 
instead, I hope to address this separately in subsequent work. 
12 In 2006, the general editor of The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham estimated that at 
least another 40 volumes would be required to put previously unpublished material in the 
public domain.     
13 John Dinwiddy, Bentham (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989) 55.  
14 Comment, 23.  
15 Ibid. 
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law. This is confirmed when Bentham states that ‘the Law delivered by Moses’ ‘in the strict 
and proper sense of the word Law, was once a Law.’16 This is because:  
It [the Law of Moses] was a collection of specific commands, delivered to a certain 
people, expressed in certain terms, affecting specific objects, armed with specific 
penalties, which in point of fact did visibly and presently follow upon disobedience to 
the commands to which they were annexed.17  
 
All the hallmarks of Bentham’s legal philosophy are here present. Biblical law is ‘strictly’ 
defined in terms of a sovereign, commands, subjects, semantic reasoning and enforceable 
penalties which produce compliant behaviour. The ‘Law of Moses’ further contrasts with ‘the 
Law, as it is called, delivered by Jesus and his Apostles.’18 This is  
rather a system of moral rules than a Law, and rather a history of transactions from 
which moral rules may be deduced, than either. [Whereas] The first [ie, the Law of 
Moses] was the Statute Law of the particular people called the Jews: the second [the 
Law of Jesus] is given as the Common Law of all nations.19  
 
Again, biblical law is presented as though it were a modern, positivistic, code (‘the 
statutes of a particular people’). It is also presented as being opposed to ‘a system of moral 
rules’ which may be understood and deduced from a wider narrative.  
In his opening moves, then, Bentham gives us a thorough-going positivist account of 
biblical law. This has been remarkably influential. We can easily demonstrate this by 
comparing his definition of the ‘Law of Moses’ with the up-to-date definition of ‘biblical law’ 
found in the eponymous entry supplied by the well-regarded Oxford Encyclopaedia of the 
Bible and Law. Here, Wells defines biblical law as neither more nor less than ‘the set of rules 
found in the texts of the Pentateuch [the first five books of the Hebrew Bible].’20 Tellingly, 
Wells goes on to claim that the Ten Commandments are ‘less relevant’ to the subject of 
‘biblical law’ because the ‘individual statements [of the Ten Commandments] carry no 
sanctions….’21 The assumptions here are pure Benthamite. It is one example among many of 
how a Benthamite definition of law, or broader philosophy of law, has moulded our 
understanding of biblical law.  
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid (emphasis in original). 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Bruce Wells, ‘Biblical Law’ in Brent A Strawn (editor-in-chief), Oxford Encyclopedia of 
Bible and Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015) 39, 39.  
21 Ibid.      
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That said, I am not suggesting Bentham’s definition of biblical law has directly 
influenced modern scholarship. Few biblical scholars have a copy of Bentham’s Comment on 
their shelves. But although there is no simple causal connection between Bentham’s writings 
on torah and biblical scholarship there are, nevertheless, many stories that could be told, if we 
had the space, about how Bentham’s ideas gained such ascendancy they even affected biblical 
scholars. They would include accounts of the rise of the modern legislative state in the 
nineteenth century and the role that Bentham’s ideas played—via John Austin and HLA Hart 
—in securing the dominance of modern positivism. It is not that Bentham’s positivism 
represents a departure from the tradition rooted in Thomas Hobbes (it is Austin who makes 
the move towards methodological legal positivism). Instead, Bentham is important because he 
represents a new phase in positivism’s articulation of a particular view of political authority 
and the idea that the authority of law depends on sovereign control in the interests of the 
people. Bentham is not radical in the Hobbesian sense (although there is, of course, a 
different, utilitarian, ethic). Rather, his radicalism consists in the way in which he carries 
through a modernist vision with particular force and rigour and applies it comprehensively. 
His lasting achievement is to identify what we today regard as the ideal characteristics of 
lawmaking.22 His positivist ideal of law is implicit in the ideal of modern law which pervades 
our whole culture. It is rather like living in the shadow of a mountain so large no-one knows it 
is there. As a result, it is not surprising that Bentham’s ideas have even permeated the 
discipline of biblical studies and are often projected by biblical scholars onto biblical law 
itself.  
This means we are justified in taking Bentham’s articulation of Torah as a 
philosophical starting point, even though scholars have been unaware of it for the best part of 
200 years. As we rediscover Bentham’s thinking on biblical law we find it is powerful and 
significant because it encapsulates a whole way of thinking about law and doing law—so 
much so that it even reflects modern scholarly assumptions about how we ought to read 
Torah. There is a parallel here with HLA Hart’s rediscovery of Bentham and legal rights; Hart 
explicitly used Bentham’s work on legal rights because Bentham encapsulated a way of 
                                                 
22 It is worth noting here that for Bentham, especially, there is a distinction between definition 
of the phenomenon, in this case ‘law’ and its ideal form. His utilitarianism (‘the science of 
legislation’) certainly falls into the latter category. 
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thinking about rights that was deeply significant, even though it had lain dormant for a long 
time.23 
The problem is that, at point after point, Bentham’s ideas do not fit the biblical texts. 
Of course, there are commands, sanctions and subjects in biblical law.24 But there is much 
more. For this reason, an adequate definition of biblical law must go beyond classical legal 
positivism (many would argue that an adequate account of modern law must go beyond this, 
too). I have argued elsewhere that torah (the Hebrew word often translated ‘law’ but which 
has the basic meaning of ‘instruction’ or ‘teaching’) is an accumulated phenomenon with 
multiple links to other expressions of normativity in the Bible, including narrative, prophecy 
and poetry.25 For these and other reasons I define biblical law as ‘an integration of different 
instructional genres of the Bible which together express a vision of society ultimately 
answerable to God.’ 26  Moreover, even where commands, sanctions and subjects can be 
identified in the biblical texts, they are conceived very differently to Bentham. For example, I 
have argued elsewhere that the biblical account of the Giving of the Law at Mount Sinai 
(which clearly involves considerations of commands, sanctions and subjects) exposes the 
inadequacy of a Benthamite conception of law when applied to biblical law.27 All this raises 
issues and questions that need a different kind of discussion from anything Bentham is 
prepared to have. The sad result is that, instead of allowing our ideas about biblical law to be 
formed by the biblical texts, on their own terms, we get them from Bentham. This means that 
the failure of many generations of scholars even to glimpse the complexity and meaning of 
biblical law is part of Bentham’s legacy.  
Having defined biblical law in these restrictive terms, Bentham turns to the question of 
its authority: 
                                                 
23 The first authoritative version of Bentham’s Of Laws in General is attributed to Hart. 
Joseph Raz credits Hart with being ‘the first to explain and discuss in detail Bentham’s 
contribution to jurisprudence’; ‘Hart on moral rights and legal duties’ (1985) 4 Oxford J of 
Legal Stud 123.    
24 Torah includes what we would understand as ‘rules.’ At this level Torah is almost 
synonymous with the word ‘commandment’ (mitsvah). 
25 Jonathan Burnside, God, Justice and Society: Aspects of Law and Legality in the Bible 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) xxxii. See also Gordon Wenham, Story as Torah 
(Grand Rapids, MI, Baker Academic, 2004) and Gordon Wenham, Psalms as Torah (Grand 
Rapids, MI, Baker Academic, 2012).  
26 Burnside, God, Justice and Society. 
27 Jonathan Burnside, ‘Moses contra Bentham: How the Giving of the Law at Sinai 
Challenges Benthamite Jurisprudence’ (forthcoming).  
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The Law of Moses, we are told, had originally, the whole of it, an original binding 
force of its own over the particular nation to whom it was delivered; and that as well in 
the character of an expression of the Will of their subordinate human legislator Moses, 
as in that of an expression of the declared explicit Will of God. It has still, a part of it, 
a binding force, and that over all nations: for example, over our own: but this no 
further than it may have been tacitly adopted by Jesus, himself a part of God, the most 
recent and most authoritative announcer of the will of himself and what remains of 
God, and by the Apostles, interpreters of the Will of Jesus.28  
  
The description of Moses as a ‘subordinate human legislator’29 again indicates that Bentham’s 
criterion of ‘binding force’ is his own positivist definition of law, based on human political 
power. This is in keeping with his earlier, positivist, definition of biblical law. The 
presentation of Moses in these terms raises the question whether Moses is a ‘sovereign’ in 
Bentham’s terms or not. Here we should recall that the key definition for Bentham is that law 
is the command of a sovereign in a State. Since God is not in a State, God cannot be a 
sovereign. It follows from this that Moses must function here as a Benthamite sovereign 
because he is the Israelites’ ‘human legislator.’ 30  Bentham here presents biblical law as 
‘positive law’ because Moses was the sovereign and the people were in the habit of obedience 
to him. At the same time, however, Bentham characterizes biblical law as ‘an expression of 
the declared explicit Will of God’ and Moses as the representative ‘subordinate’ or delegate 
of God. In that sense, Bentham’s account of the authority of biblical law tries to have it both 
ways. Biblical law is both ‘from God’ and ‘from Moses.’ However, we should not put too 
much weight on Bentham’s reference to the ‘Will of God.’ Bentham is careful to say that this 
is something we are only ‘told’, so it is not a view to which Bentham is committed and, of 
course, Bentham does not recognize the ‘Will of God’ as having any ontological or 
epistemological validity. 
In this opening move, then, Bentham chops biblical law to fit his Procrustean bed. At 
best he does not capture the full picture of biblical law; at worst he prevents us from 
understanding biblical law as it really is. This means that modern readers must not read 
biblical law as if Benthamite jurisprudence is our ideal. Biblical scholarship needs to come to 
terms with Bentham’s influence on legal positivism and, in turn, with the effect of legal 
positivism on studies in biblical law. Reading biblical law in that direction is wrong. Only 
when we have deconstructed the influence of Benthamite jurisprudence can we recover a way 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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of thinking about biblical law that does justice to the biblical texts. 
Bentham’s definition of biblical law forms the background against which he launches 
his attack on its authority. The remainder of this chapter examines Bentham’s arguments with 
the following questions in mind: (1) What specific arguments does Bentham deploy to 
overthrow the authority of biblical law?; (2) What does this suggest about how Bentham 
understands the authority of biblical law?; (3) How strong are these arguments?—all of which 
lead up to question; (4) Does Bentham successfully engage with the problem of the authority 
of biblical law? These research questions are important since, as far as I am aware, Bentham’s 
analysis of the Bible has largely escaped critical evaluation. It is time for us to be sceptical 
about Bentham’s scepticism and to turn Bentham’s critique upon itself.31 In doing so, I seek to 
challenge Bentham’s perspective on biblical law, which derives from his own self- 
constructed standards of reference, on the basis of an alternative understanding of biblical 
law. I do not, of course, necessarily expect readers to share this viewpoint regarding the 
authority of biblical law, or its place within the Christian tradition. On the contrary, I fully 
expect readers to have a different appreciation of these matters. Nevertheless, I trust that the 
following argument will serve its purpose as a tool in re-evaluating Bentham, even though 
readers may not share my particular perspective.   
 
III   BENTHAM’S SPECIFIC OPPOSITION TO THE AUTHORITY OF BIBLICAL LAW  
 
The authority of biblical law presents itself most sharply to Bentham by those whom he calls 
‘sticklers for the universal and perpetual authority of that Law [ie, the Law of Moses].’32 He 
says that whilst they accept that many of the Mosaic laws ‘are of a local nature’ (ie, given 
purely for Israel) and that the reasons behind their use are ‘plainly referable to the peculiar 
circumstances of the people they were given to’ they also say that many laws: 
are plainly of a nature not local… well suited then to the circumstances of that country 
[ie, Israel] they were: well suited they now are to the circumstances of this. Not being 
                                                 
31 For example, Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham: Prophet of Secularism, 80th Conway 
Memorial Lecture (London, South Place Ethical Society, 2012) is content to simply repeat 
Bentham’s exegesis of biblical texts including a supposed homosexual relationship between 
David and Jonathan and Bentham’s claim that Jesus probably engaged in homosexual 
practices. Regarding the latter, Bentham cites the presence of the young man referred to in 
Mark 14:51-52 as indicating there was a strong bond between Jesus and a male prostitute. 
Schofield makes no attempt whatsoever to evaluate the plausibility of these readings.  
32 Bentham, Comment, 26. 
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expressly repealed by Jesus, they are therefore still in force. To neglect them is 
impious.33   
 
Bentham does not tell us who these persons are. Possibly he refers to them because he wants 
to engage with the strongest (or most extreme) account of the authority of biblical law. Their 
views are, impliedly, unrepresentative of the wider Church because, he claims, even the most 
conventional and well-regarded Christians reject the authority of biblical law: 
As to the notion of adopting the Law of Moses in its whole extent, even those articles 
of it that are of the nature of the political regulations, and in no wise concern the 
ceremonies of the Jewish religion this has been of late universally exploded by persons 
of all sects, in particular by writers of our own Church the most orthodox and the most 
distinguished for their attachment to religion.34  
 
Bentham does not cite any sources for this so, again, we do not know to whom he was 
referring. But as far as he is concerned ‘neglect of the Law of Moses’ 35 is the default position, 
even within the Church. Why, then, should anyone take biblical law seriously?  
Bentham thus constructs the argument as though he is defending an apparently 
standard view within the Christian Church. When he denies the authority of biblical law in the 
pubic square he is not, apparently, making a radical religious or political claim. On the 
contrary, he is merely establishing orthodoxy. This line of argument suits Bentham’s purposes 
extremely well. He wants to ‘throw off the grip of religion from all areas of public life.’36 
Here church leaders, and even the Bible itself, are co-opted to these ends.  
Bentham undermines the authority of biblical law on the following grounds: (a) 
neither Jesus nor the Apostles formally identify a body of binding moral law; (b) the New 
Testament is inconsistent on the subject; (c) Jesus is inconsistent on the subject, according to 
the New Testament; (d) Paul’s presentation of the subject is inconsistent; (e) biblical law is 
ultimately subservient to utility; (f) its proponents are fanatics and lunatics and (g) biblical 
law is inherently damaging to society. We shall consider each in turn.  
 
A  Neither Jesus Nor the Apostles Formally Identify a Body of Binding Moral Law  
 
                                                 
33 Ibid.    
34 Ibid, [25].  
35 Ibid, [26].  
36 Schofield, Prophet of Secularism, 4.  
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Bentham is aware of the Christian convention of making distinctions within biblical law. 
Historically speaking, the tradition of a threefold distinction between ‘ceremonial’, ‘civil’ and 
‘moral’ is closely associated with Protestant Reformed theology,37 although the tradition is 
present in Thomas Aquinas38 and extends as far back as Tertullian in the fifth century,39 at 
least.40 Bentham concerns himself with only one distinction and hence with two potential 
categories; viz the ‘Ceremonial Law’ as ‘containing what is supposed to have been abolished 
by Jesus’41 and the ‘Moral Law’ as ‘containing what is supposed to have been adopted and 
retained.’42 For Bentham, this distinction leaves him ‘a good deal in the dark’43 because:   
Jesus has nowhere made any division of the Laws of Moses into two parcels and said 
of the one parcel, ‘this ye shall obey’, and of the other, ‘this ye shall not obey, or may 
obey or not as ye think proper.’ Never did Jesus this: never did any Apostle. By no one 
has it been ever said they did. Not only is it true that neither by Jesus nor by any 
Apostle have the contents of such respective parcels anywhere been ascertained, but 
no division into any such two parcels is anywhere expressly mentioned.44   
 
This is anathema for Bentham whose entire legal philosophy has as its goal minimizing 
indeterminacy in the law:  
… if it is difficult, as it may be, to say what is the human Common Law, it is a 
thousand times more difficult to say what is the Divine Law. So that if it be but too 
easy for a man to find an inlet for his own caprice under shelter of the first-mentioned 
exception, it is a thousand times more easy under shelter of this last.45  
 
It is perfectly true that neither Jesus nor the apostles formally identify a body of 
binding moral law. However, the real issue is Bentham’s prior commitment to positivist ideas 
regarding authority and law. Bentham defines law exclusively in terms of the authoritative 
commands of a (human) sovereign in a state. And since Jesus does not issue a command 
regarding which parts of the Mosaic law are valid or not, Bentham claims we cannot identify 
                                                 
37 Eg Jean Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book Fourth, ch 20, s 14.  
https://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.vi.xxi.html. 
38 Summa Theologica, 2a, Question 99, Art 4.< http://newadvent.org/summa/2099.htm>.  
39 Tertullian, An Answer to the Jews, chs 2 and 5.  
<http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0308.htm.> 
40 See Philip S Ross, From The Finger Of God (Fearn, Mentor, 2010) 19ff. 
41 Bentham, Comment, 23. 
42 Ibid.   
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid, [23]-[24]. Baumgardt agrees with Bentham’s analysis: ‘the extent to which the Mosaic 
Law is binding is so uncertain that this precludes the general validity of any moral rule 
deducible from the Pentateuch’, Bentham, 102.   
45 Ibid, 200.  
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which parts of the law are binding. Bentham’s objection is thus one of his own making 
because the authority of biblical law, for Christians, is not grounded in any formal distinction 
by Jesus or the apostles between different types of law. Bentham’s objection that there is no 
distinction in the New Testament therefore carries no weight.  
Instead, the authority of biblical law for Christians is grounded in narrative terms. As 
far as the New Testament is concerned, the Old Testament is the beginning of The Story 
which has now reached its climax in the person of Jesus Christ. The book of Hebrews, for 
example, says that: ‘what is becoming obsolete and growing old is ready to vanish away’ 
(8:13). The immediate referent is to the Temple but the writer is also catching up in that other 
parts of the Hebrew Bible which were good in their time but which are now obsolete in God’s 
purposes.46 The ‘old’ includes everything that distinguished ancient Israel from all the other 
nations, including its food and purity laws (which are, incidentally, labelled ‘ceremonial’ laws 
by some Christian theologians). The point about the food laws (cf Mark 7), the distinctive 
forms of clothing and the ban on planting two kinds of seed in the same field (eg Leviticus 
19:19) was to make the Jewish people distinct from the nations and to preserve a measure of 
separation from Gentiles. This was important because preserving Jewish identity was vital to 
continuing the story of God working through His chosen people, and ultimately working 
through a Jewish Messiah. It is precisely because Jesus is understood to have succeeded in 
abolishing the barriers between humanity and God and between Jews and Gentiles that 
Christians do not—and must not—practice laws concerned with preserving ethnic and cultic 
separation. This means that identifying what is normative, and what is not, cannot be 
determined by reference to a formal source. Instead, it is a function of knowing where you are 
in the story, for those who are believers in Jesus.  
But although there is ethnic discontinuity between the Old and the New Testaments 
there is also ethnic continuity. The New Testament teaches both that Jesus is the fulfilment of 
Torah (Romans 10:4) and that Jewish and Gentile believers are united in Christ’s risen body 
(Romans 10:12; Colossians 2:9-12). Christians must therefore maintain ethical continuity with 
Torah. Much more could be said on this, but suffice it to say that Gentile (and Jewish) 
believers in Jesus are in fact obligated to follow a more intensified form of the written torah 
and Jewish practice in terms of, for example, sexual behaviour (1 Corinthians 6:13b-20) and 
prayer (1 Thessalonians 5:17).  
                                                 
46 It should be said in passing that this does not involve any denigration of what is now 
considered ‘obsolete’ or ‘old’, any more than one would scorn a Rolls-Royce that has 
successfully brought a person to their destination. 
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To sum up, Bentham misunderstands the sense in which biblical law exercises 
authority over Christians. He tries to make the Bible fit his preconceived ideas about authority 
and law. The various continuities and discontinuities between the Old Testament and the New 
are not grounded in a ‘legislator’ who makes a formal division between different types of law. 
Instead, they are distinguished narratively, but consistently, in terms of where Christians are 
located in the story of God and His redemption of creation. Christians can thus be clear about 
how they are supposed to relate to biblical law, even though neither Jesus nor the apostles 
make any legislative amendment to the Laws of Moses (which is what Bentham is looking 
for).  
 
B   The New Testament is Inconsistent on the Subject 
 
Bentham’s next criticism follows from the preceding claim and states that the New 
Testament’s view on the authority of biblical law is inconsistent:  
That which the Will of Jesus, and of the Apostles, interpreters of his Will, is to be 
collected from, is the general aspect of their discourse towards the Law of Moses: now 
speaking in favour of it, and now in derogation. To speak now in favour, now in 
derogation of the same whole, would savour, it seems to have been supposed, of levity 
and inconsistency. It would seem not to be the discourse of a Legislator, much less of 
a divine one.47   
 
Again, the problem is one of Bentham’s making. It arises because of his insistence upon 
reading biblical law according to his theory of law and rejecting as ‘non-law’ everything that 
doesn’t fit. Instead of seeking to understand why continuities and discontinuities exist 
between the Old and New Testaments, Bentham simply plays them off against each other. 
This allows him to declare they are inconsistent and possess no authority as law.  
In doing so, Bentham again fails to understand how biblical law makes claims upon 
the Christian (see section A above). Nor does Bentham allow for the fact that the meaning of 
the New Testament word for ‘law’ (nomos) is context-dependent. There are certainly times 
when the apostles—Paul, in particular —speak positively about ‘the law’ and times when they 
do not. But these variations arise because the different contexts concern right and wrong uses 
                                                 
47 Bentham, Comment, 24. Baumgardt again concurs with Bentham: ‘… genuine moral laws 
cannot be derived from either part of the Law of Revelation: neither from the Old Testament, 
primarily because it is not clear to what extent its law still has binding force; nor yet from the 
New Testament, because there is no definitive law therein formulated. In other words, in the 
former case there exists a Law, but it is not strictly obligatory; in the latter case there exists 
binding force, but not a sufficient number of explicit moral laws’; Bentham, 103.  
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of the law, not the nature of the law itself. Jesus himself challenged unacceptable 
interpretations of the Torah and put forward His own authoritative interpretations on key 
issues (eg Matthew 5:21-48); likewise, Paul challenges wrongful interpretations of the law, 
and upholds the right use of the law, for followers of Jesus. For example, in the early church, 
some argued that obeying circumcision and food laws was necessary for salvation (Galatians 
2:12). This was a wrong use of the law because (as noted in the previous section) Jesus came 
to abolish ethnic distinctions between Jews and Gentiles. Re-establishing ethnic divisions is 
thus a denial of the Gospel. But to speak of a wrongful way of using the law is to uphold a 
proper use of the law, such as found in Romans 7:12 (‘So the law is holy, and the 
commandment is holy and righteous and good’). As noted in the previous section, the 
authority of biblical law is grounded in a narrative understanding of what is and is not 
normative, given the significance that is attached to the life, death and bodily resurrection of 
Jesus. This accounts for the continuities and discontinuities. The New Testament takes Torah 
extremely seriously but, as the Gospels and Epistles make clear, it is Torah understood under 
Jesus’ direction.  
 
C   Jesus is Inconsistent on the Subject, According to the New Testament  
 
Another difficulty, claims Bentham, is Jesus’ own attitude towards the Law. He writes: ‘As to 
Jesus, we find him treating the Law itself with contempt, and the adherents to it with 
ridicule.’48 Bentham initially tries to resolve the tension by noting Jesus’ attitude is apparently 
in respect of ‘the ceremonial part.’ 49  However, this does not resolve the problem since 
Bentham notes that the law commanding circumcision belongs to ‘the ceremonial part’50 
which Jesus apparently despised—yet ‘he himself was circumcised.’51 In addition, ‘we find 
the same Jesus declaring of the whole law in general, that he came not to destroy but to fulfil 
it.’52 Bentham’s argument here runs along similar lines to section B above: Jesus’ handling of 
the various laws is inconsistent, therefore the laws cannot either be rational or the product of a 
rational sovereign.  
                                                 
48 Ibid, [24]. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
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Certainly, Jews were scandalized by Jesus’ radical attitude toward contemporary 
interpretations of the Sabbath and purity laws (Matthew 12:1-14; Mark 7:1-23) as well as 
other Jewish traditions which he stated negated Torah (Mark 7:8-13). However, Bentham’s 
presentation is again misleading and inadequate. Jesus’ radicalism stems from his identity as 
the authoritative mediator of Torah who can set out the definitive exposition of the law 
(Matthew 7:28-29). Sometimes this virtually amounted to the promulgation of new law. There 
was a fine line between this and the accusation that Jesus was abolishing ‘the law and the 
prophets’; a charge Jesus expressly denies. Indeed, Jesus’ claim to fulfil Torah (Matthew 
5:17) entails a positive evaluation of that which is being fulfilled. 
Though it would take too long to illustrate this fully, Jesus’ reworking, redefining and 
categorizing of Torah around himself is consistent with the radical way in which he redraws 
other key aspects of Jewish praxis, including Temple, land, family, ‘zeal’, prayer and 
Scripture.53 All are radically redefined around who Jesus is; none are left untouched. Thus, 
Jesus displaces the Temple as the place where the people meet with God (eg Matthew 12:6) 
and where forgiveness is pronounced (eg Matthew 9:1-8); the whole earth becomes the 
inheritance of Israel’s Messiah (eg Matthew 28:18-20); traditional boundary markers between 
Jew and Gentile are abolished (eg Ephesians 2:14); blood ties are subordinated to primary 
allegiance to Jesus (eg Matthew 10:37); nationalist zealotry is transposed from ethnic to 
cosmic and spiritual battle (eg Ephesians 6:12); prayer now takes place all the time (eg 1 
Thessalonians 5:17) in the spirit to God as father through Jesus the Lord (eg Ephesians 5:18b-
20) whilst all the Scriptures become a collective witness to the person and work of Jesus (eg 
Luke 24:27).  
The point is that Bentham’s attempt to play a few texts off against each other to derive 
an apparent contradiction does not even begin to engage with what is actually going on in the 
New Testament, namely, the creation of a newly-crafted symbolic universe that redraws 
Jewish social praxis whilst remaining within a thoroughly distinctive Jewish worldview.   
  
D   Paul’s Presentation of the Subject is Inconsistent 
 
Bentham’s fourth point is closely related to section C, above, namely, that the apostle Paul is 
equally inconsistent in his handling of biblical law. ‘For all this an Apostle scrupled not to say 
that neither circumcision availed anything, nor uncircumcision [a reference to Galatians 5:6 
                                                 
53 NT Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God (London, SPCK, 2013) 354-375. 
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and Galatians 6:15]; while the same Apostle says in another place….’54 Here, a space is left in 
Bentham’s manuscript with jottings that state: ‘Peter Paul – Meats. Unclean things – blood.’55 
The former certainly refers to the dispute between Peter and Paul regarding table fellowship 
with Gentiles (Galatians 2:11ff) whilst the latter may refer to the decision of the Council of 
Jerusalem regarding Gentile Christians (Acts 15:1-35; Galatians 2:1-10).   
Once again, Bentham misunderstands the issues.56 Regarding circumcision, the verse 
Bentham quotes (‘For neither circumcision counts for anything nor uncircumcision, but 
keeping the commandments of God’; 1 Corinthians 7:19) is an ‘obvious oxymoron’57, not 
least because circumcision itself is commanded in biblical law (eg Leviticus 12:3)! Again, the 
issue is not one of ‘inconsistency’ but of covenantal eschatology. Since in the Messiah, God 
has unveiled his purpose of making one family and one people, to insist on markers of 
division denies the Messiah himself and his achievement. Elsewhere, in Romans 4, Paul 
argues that since Abraham himself was uncircumcised at the time of the covenant in Genesis 
15, circumcised Jews are incorporated into a family of uncircumcised covenant members, 
beginning with Abraham himself.58 Consequently, it is not circumcision that is the badge of 
belonging to God’s covenant people but faith or faithfulness (pistis, in Greek), that is, the 
faith shown by Abraham whilst still uncircumcised and the faithfulness displayed, supremely, 
by Jesus himself. Again, it is wholly inadequate to present this as ‘inconsistency.’ Symbols 
are here being recast, this time in terms of a long-standing Jewish debate regarding 
‘circumcision of the heart’ (Romans 2:25-29; cf Deuteronomy 10:16; 30:6). 
The debate around table-fellowship, which Bentham also brings up, plays out in a 
similar way. Since the loving and saving death of the Messiah ‘has made us both one and has 
broken down in his flesh the dividing wall of hostility’ (Ephesians 2:14) that existed between 
Jews and Gentiles, Messianic Jews and Gentiles who eat at different tables are effectively 
saying that the Messiah might as well not have died. Paul thus regards it as ‘absolutely 
imperative that all those ‘in the Messiah’ belong at the same table.’59 As Wright puts it ‘the 
unity of the Messiah’s people has taken the place, within the community-defining symbol-
                                                 
54 Bentham, Comment, 24. 
55 Noted by Burns and Hart, Comment, 24, n 6. 
56 Unaware of the irony, Bentham doubts the ability of interpreters to correctly interpret the 
texts (Comment, 28) and patronisingly considers that ‘Hebrew is a fine language for the 
expression of simple ideas’ (Works, vol 10, 583).   
57 Wright, Paul, 361.  
58 Ibid, [363].  
59 Ibid, [359].  
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system, of the socio-cultural identity of the strict Jew’. 60  At the same time, ‘the new 
Messianic law of who you can eat with is…used to exclude those whose behavior has 
effectively denied that they belong to the Messiah in the first place’ (emphasis original)61, 
namely, those who are ‘guilty of sexual immorality or greed, or is an idolater, reviler, 
drunkard, or swindler’ (1 Corinthians 5:11). Table-fellowship is thus a good example of how 
the authority of biblical law is meant to play out in church life; there is ethnic discontinuity 
between the Old and New Testaments but there is also ethical continuity. Paul is every bit as 
concerned about purity and table fellowship as he was in his former life as Saul the Pharisee; 
the difference is that, in the Messiah, the boundaries are radically redrawn. ‘The [Messianic] 
community is defined by the Messiah, and by faithfulness to him… [and] the sacrificial death 
by which his own faithfulness was acted out.’62 
Again, it is not sufficient to simply pit a few texts against each other, even allowing 
for the fact that, like any author, Paul may be allowed to vary his emphases in the light of his 
particular audiences and purposes. We are not dealing with inconsistency, per Bentham. 
Instead, we are dealing with a redrawn social praxis, with new symbolic markers, within the 
same, Jewish-style, creational and covenantal monotheism.  
 
E   Biblical law is Ultimately Subservient to Utility  
 
The next stage of Bentham’s argument follows from his preceding claims regarding 
inconsistency. Bentham states that the lack of any clear guidance as to what belongs to the 
‘ceremonial’ and the ‘moral’ law means theologians have been left to make this distinction for 
themselves. This means there is no secure basis for identifying the scope of the ‘moral’ law 
which binds Christians. Bentham asserts that theologians distinguish between the two groups 
according to ‘the general or particular utility of … the regulation in question.’63  
Coming from God they [i.e. the biblical laws] must all of course possess a certain 
utility, or at least a certain worth equal or superior to use. Every article then being 
useful, if generally useful to all who should observe it, of any other nation as well as 
of the Jewish, it is an article of the moral Law and as such belongs to us who are never 
mentioned by it, as well as to the Jews to whom it was delivered. If no utility can be 
                                                 
60 Ibid, [360] (emphasis removed from original). 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Bentham, Comment, 25. Baumgardt concurs: ‘The logical conclusion… is that only the 
principle of utility, not any divine law, decides what is morally right or wrong….’ (Bentham, 
104). 
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found or supposed in our observing it, its utility is then of the special kind, and it 
belongs not to us, but belongs only, that is, belonged formerly to the Jews.64  
 
This means that: 
with respect to such articles as are now useful, these it is now proper for us as 
Legislators to cause to be observed; as subjects, to observe… But under this 
explanation how can any human Law be contrary to this part of the Law of God, 
unless in as far as it is contrary to utility: that is, how can any man complain of such 
human law and argue for its being disobeyed on any other ground than that of his 
thinking it inexpedient?65 
 
If even theologians use utility to identify which divine laws are valid, the authority of biblical 
law is ultimately grounded, not in its divinity but in its utility.66 Bentham does not cite any 
examples of theologians who behave in this way, which is unfortunate since his claim at this 
point is self-serving. But his assertion is consistent with his claim, made earlier in the 
document, that commitment to the ‘moral’ law means reconciling the Mosaic Law ‘to our 
notions of that knowledge of human nature which teaches how to settle the purport of a Law, 
and of that knowledge of language which teaches how to fix upon the expression.’67 In other 
words, the moral law is relevant only to the extent that it adheres to the modern idea of Law 
that is clear and rational. By these means, Bentham makes the Bible subservient to his 
principle of utility:  
To the dictates of this principle [utility], then, in any case what is given for a dictate of 
the Law of Revelation is either opposite or conformable. If opposite, what is given for 
the dictate of the Law of Revelation must be rejected… If conformable, that 
consideration is of itself reason sufficient for adopting of the measure: that alone fully 
justifies it….68  
 
                                                 
64 Bentham, Comment, 25b (emphasis in original).   
65 Ibid. 
66 Bentham’s disciple Austin makes a slightly different claim which relates, not to God’s 
revealed law, but to God’s unrevealed law: ‘the benevolence of God, with the principle of 
general utility, is our only index or guide to his unrevealed law’; John Austin, The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined (Wilfrid E Rumble (ed); Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1995) 41. Cf ‘The whole of our conduct should be guided by the principle of utility, in so far 
as the conduct to be pursued has not been determined by Revelation’ (ibid, 45; emphasis in 
original). 
67 Bentham, Comment, 24. 
68 Ibid, [27]-[8]. 
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Moreover, if biblical law is ultimately subordinate to the principle of utility it has 
value only insofar as it motivates citizens to act on that basis. ‘Revealed Theology’69 or 
‘Divine Law,’ like ‘natural Theology,’ is helpful only to ‘Legislation’ when it ‘suggest[s] 
motives to governors to adopt and to people to submit to such regulations as by other 
considerations shall have been determined to be proper.’70 Biblical law cannot be consulted 
for a ‘precept’, though it may provide ‘evidence of a sanction.’71 It has no greater significance 
than, say, Melanesian frog worship, if the latter can manipulate some citizens to obey the law.   
Finally, utility is used as a necessary, if not sufficient, test of the authenticity of 
revelation itself:   
… if we lay it down as a fixed principle that whatever Laws have been given by the 
Author of Revelation were meant by him to be Laws subservient to the happiness of 
the present life, that this subserviency is an indispensable evidence of the authenticity 
of what are given for such Laws, that is, of their really coming from him, to know 
whether a measure is conformable to the dictates of the principle of utility is at once 
the readiest and the surest way of knowing whether it is conformable to the dictates of 
the Law of Revelation.72  
 
It is a kind of reverse alchemy; Bentham wants to take the gold of Torah and transmute it into 
the base metal of utilitarianism.  
However, contrary to Bentham’s assumptions, it remains the case that Christians can 
know the divine will independent of ideological claims to utility. First, as noted in section B, 
above, Christians have an alternative, consistent, basis for determining the continuing 
authority of biblical law. It is not dependent on utility. Second, Christians do not have to 
assume utility as the arbiter of biblical law because biblical law is not itself the product of 
autonomous reason. It is hard to imagine how either autonomous reason or the principle of 
utility could have given rise to the sort of radically egalitarian society we find described in 
biblical law (eg in regard to the distribution of land and political power). 73  All political 
revolutions benefit one social group or another and altruistic political revolutions are as 
unknown in the ancient world as they are in the modern. And since no single social group 
benefits from the political society found in biblical law there is no reason for it to have arisen. 
                                                 
69 Bentham defines ‘Revealed theology’ as ‘that which professes to teach what is called the 
Revealed Law, the Law of Revelation’ which consists he says, for Christians, in ‘the Law 
delivered by Moses’ and ‘the Law… delivered by Jesus and his Apostles’; Comment, 23. 
70 Bentham, Comment, 22.  
71 Ibid, [23](emphasis in original).  
72 Ibid. 
73 Berman, Created Equal.  
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In this regard, the revelation at Sinai is a rebuke to autonomous reason because neither reason 
nor utility is capable of producing the sort of society found in biblical law. Nor does 
revelation have to be subordinated to reason in order to be reasoned about, not least because, 
as Hazony has argued at length, ‘the texts of the Hebrew Bible… are in fact much closer to 
being works of reason than anything else.’74 
 
F   Its Proponents are Fanatics and Lunatics   
 
This brings us to one of the least edifying of Bentham’s arguments. Burns and Hart find a 
note from Bentham’s Inserenda which, they say, although not expressly marked for inclusion, 
nevertheless seems to belong at this point in the Comment.75 This is because of Bentham’s 
reference to the page numbers of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-
1769). Bentham quotes from Sir William Blackstone as follows:  
… it is an established rule to abide by former precedents… Yet this rule admits of 
exception, where the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason; much 
more if it be contrary to the divine law.76  
 
The idea that human law is not absolute and that rulers are called to give an account 
before God would have been anathema for Bentham for it would have meant, for him, the end 
of political society. Not only is biblical law inherently uncertain, it makes human law 
uncertain and might encourage disobedience among the population:77 
When somebody who pretends to be versed in the Law of Revelation or in the non-
entity of the Law of Nature gives the word and pronounces one of these Laws to be 
counteracted by any human Law, then it is that this human Law, come what will of it, 
                                                 
74 Hazony, Philosophy, 3. 
75 Comment, 27, n 2.  
76 Commentaries on the Law of England; I Comm 69-70. Note that Austin finds room for 
biblical law (as a form of religious law) within his definition of ‘law properly so called.’ ‘the 
laws of God, are laws set by God to his human creatures… they are laws or rules, properly so 
called’ (Province, 38; emphasis in original). In contrast to Bentham, Austin also states that 
‘certain of God’s laws were as binding on the first man, as they are binding at this hour on the 
millions who have sprung from his loins’ (Province, 28; emphasis in original). For a 
discussion of the difference between Bentham and Austin on this point, see Bernard S 
Jackson, ‘Structuralism and the notion of religious law’ (1982/3) 2/3 Investigaciones 
Semioticas 1. 
77 ‘We must always remember that out of the whole of what has been ever called the Divine 
Law, our Author makes no exception. It is all brought up to set in array against the Law of the 
Land; Mosaic Law and all’; Bentham, Comment, 200.  
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is to be transgressed. A doctrine more favourable to the enterprizes of fanatics could 
not have issued from the school of Loyola.78 
 
Hart sees the latter reference as denoting those writers who have contended that subjects are 
justified in resisting, deposing and even killing ruling tyrants.79 Bentham sums up with the 
slogan: ‘Farewell Law and Common Sense: Welcome, Fanaticism….’80 
And hello lunacy. Referring to Blackstone’s quotation, Bentham writes:   
This distemperature of the brain is not a mere transient delirium: it is a confirmed 
lunacy permanently seated in the brain and breaking out at distant intervals.… He 
[Blackstone] is there [in the Commentaries] speaking of the rule of judicial decisions, 
‘to abide by former precedents’: that this is an established form: he then tells us it 
admits of an exception: and that is ‘where the former determination’ is contrary to the 
divine law and that ‘much more’ than if it be ‘most evidently contrary to reason.’ I 
would not be impertinent: and yet I have curiosity. I wonder how he has managed … 
in these sentiments he has kept his foreskin’ 81   
 
The latter is a reference to circumcision as the sign of the covenant between God and 
Abraham’s descendants (though for Bentham’s misunderstanding of the circumcision laws 
under the new covenant see section D, above). Bentham here labels those who hold to the 
authority of biblical law as lunatics.  
Finally, there is more than a hint of anti-Semitism in Bentham’s speculation on 
whether Blackstone has kept his foreskin since its rhetorical force presupposes the 
unacceptability of a distinctively Jewish contribution. Bentham is saying that only a Jew 
could make such a stupid point about the overriding nature of divine law. It is tantamount to 
accusing Blackstone of being a Jew in secret in a way that implies to be Jewish is a slur. 
Bentham’s allegation of being a crypto-Jew may not, sadly, have been unusual for the times. 
The outcry in 1753 over the Jew Bill indicates how, in the words of Horace Walpole—the 
leading historian of the age—mid-eighteenth century England ‘was still enslaved to the 
grossest and most vulgar prejudices.’82 It is another low point in Bentham’s argument. Here, 
as elsewhere, the violence of his rhetoric makes us wonder what is really at stake. We shall 
return to this further below.  
 
                                                 
78 Bentham, Comment, Appendix F, 346. 
79 Burns and Hart, ibid, n 3.  
80 Bentham, Comment, 200. 
81 Ibid, 26-27 (original emphasis).       
82 Cited in David S Katz, The Jews in the History of England (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1994) 240. I have not had access to the original source.  
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G   Biblical law is Inherently Damaging to Society 
 
Bentham draws on Edmund Burke’s, An account of the European settlements in America,83 to 
claim that all attempts to apply biblical law in society are inherently damaging:  
The people who composed the new colonies’ (speaking of America) it has been 
observed by an historian of the first eminence ‘imitated the Jewish polity in almost all 
respects; and adopted the books of Moses as the Law of the Land.’ This the historian 
scruples not to speak of as being the effect of a ‘contracted way of thinking and most 
violent enthusiasm.’ ‘The first laws which they made’ (continues he) ‘were grounded 
upon them’ (upon the books of Moses) ‘and were therefore very ill suited to the 
customs, genius or circumstances of that country, and of those times; for which reason 
they have since fallen into disuse.84  
 
Bentham here endorses Burke’s view that the sort of people who are interested in applying 
biblical law are narrow-minded and dangerous bigots. It resonates with Bentham’s labelling 
of such persons as fanatics and lunatics (see Section F). Elsewhere in the Comment, Bentham 
deploys the experience of ‘the deluded people of the Massachusets (sic)’85 whose belief in 
witchcraft—informed by biblical law—‘tainted the air with the pestilence of murdering 
perjury, and the land with innocent blood.’86  
However, there are problems with Bentham’s argument. First, Bentham uncritically 
accepts Burke’s claim that the American colonies wholly abandoned their commitment to the 
application of biblical law. This was a premature judgement on Bentham and Burke’s part. 
Neither reckoned with the endurance of the Bible. In fact, as modern historical accounts have 
shown, the influence of the Bible continued to be felt on the political development of the 
United States, and remains so to this day.  
Second, Bentham endorses Burke’s view that this apparent failure is due, ipso facto, to 
their being ‘grounded… upon the books of Moses.’87 But although this is presented as an 
empirical argument, the presence of the word ‘therefore’ reveals it is, in fact, an ideological 
claim since neither Bentham nor Burke will admit to the possibility that these laws could be 
                                                 
83 Burke’s account was in its fifth edition at the time of Bentham’s writing. Burns and Hart 
note that although the book is attribute to Edmund Burke, who revised it, the book was largely 
the work of his cousin, William, 25, n 2.  
84 Bentham, Comment, 25-26 (emphasis in original).  
85 Ibid, 200. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid, 26. 
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successfully transplanted. It is not, then, the pragmatic argument it appears to be but an 
ideological claim. Bentham fails to allow for the possibility of virtue.88 
We do find, elsewhere, that Bentham applauds the effective promulgation of biblical 
law and its commitment to transparent justice at the city gates.89 This is not a contradiction for 
Bentham because he finds these texts to be consistent with the principle of utility (see Part III 
section E). Yet, even here, Bentham’s appreciation of biblical law is thin. He ignores 
additional ways his ideas could derive some support from biblical law. They include: the 
commitment in biblical law to disseminating knowledge of the law to all levels of society; the 
ideal of domestic justice; the avoidance of third party adjudication; due publicity; imaginative 
forms of punishment; the wise use of words and the use of motivation clauses.90 Bentham 
ignores the positive intellectual and political legacy of biblical law, even when it would 
advance his principle of utility. 
To conclude, just as Bentham constructs a definition of biblical law that does not do 
justice to the biblical texts so he also constructs arguments regarding the authority of biblical 
law that do not actually engage with the Bible’s own conception of its authority. Space 
forbids even an outline treatment of how the Bible understands its own authority. But, at the 
very least, one would have to say that it goes well beyond a Benthamite notion of sovereign 
exercise of power to include the idea of authority as a legitimating permission that constitutes 
sufficient and meaningful grounds for action because it is grounded in a dimension of reality. 
The Bible itself bears witness to a number of interconnected realities including: (1) the 
existence of God; (2) the nature of God; (3) human identity and human flourishing; (4) Jesus’ 
resurrection and (5) the mission of the people of God. Each of these realities authorizes 
persons to act in different ways and, in authorizing them, provides opportunities whilst at the 
same time setting boundaries around the freedom to act. Again, this points towards a different 
kind of discussion than anything Bentham is prepared to countenance. Although his 
arguments are presented in defence of a (supposedly) orthodox, Christian, position, Bentham 
applies the same tactic in regard to the authority of biblical law as he does to the definition of 
biblical law, that is, he constructs the arguments to suit his prior philosophy of law and 
                                                 
88 For an overview of its virtue, see Jonathan Burnside, ‘The Spirit of Biblical Law’ (2012) 1 
Oxford J of Law & Religion 127. 
89 Jeremy Bentham, Works of Jeremy Bentham (Bowring edn), vol 5, (Edinburgh, William 
Tait, 1843), 544. 
90 See Jonathan Burnside, ‘Biblical Law and the Benthamite Ideal of Law and Society’ 
(forthcoming).   
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ignores what does not fit. Bentham does not actually engage with the problem of the authority 
of biblical law but, rather, constructs a version to suit his own purposes.  
 
IV   BENTHAM’S GENERAL ARGUMENTS FOR OPPOSING THE AUTHORITY OF 
BIBLICAL LAW 
 
 
It may be sufficient to leave the matter there; however, Bentham’s engagement with biblical 
law raises the question of to what extent his views in the Comment cohere with his writings 
elsewhere. This is relevant because there is considerable scholarly debate concerning the 
extent to which Bentham’s ‘religious radicalism’ relates to his ‘political radicalism.’ 91 
Moreover, if it is the case that Bentham lost interest in developing the Comment further, we 
need to know whether Bentham’s opposition to the authority of biblical law in that text is 
consistent with his, perhaps more developed, thought elsewhere. We can identify several main 
ways in which it is so.  
 
A   The Neophiliac Challenge   
 
First, Bentham’s opposition to biblical law is consistent with his opposition to anything that 
requires contemporary persons to surrender their own sense of judgment. Nothing that has 
either happened or was decided in the past can ground authority in the present:  
Instead of being guided by their own judgement, the men of the nineteenth century 
shut their own eyes, and give themselves up to be led blindfold by the men of the 
eighteenth century… Men who have a century more of experience to ground their 
judgments on, surrender their intellect to men who had a century less experience, and 
who, unless that deficiency constitutes a claim, have no claim to preference.92  
 
Bentham’s Book of Fallacies speaks of the ‘Fallacy of Irrevocable Laws’ according to which 
an apparently ‘beneficial’ law cannot be enacted because of an immutable regulation that 
prevents ‘all succeeding legislators from enacting [such] a law.’93 The end result is that ‘… 
the aggregate body of the living would remain for ever in subjection to an inexorable tyranny, 
                                                 
91 See, eg, the debate between Philip Schofield, ‘Political and religious radicalism in the 
thought of Jeremy Bentham’ (1999) 20 History of Political Thought 272 and J E Crimmins, 
‘Bentham’s Religious Radicalism Revisited: A Response to Schofield’ (2001) 22 History of 
Political Thought 494. 
92 Jeremy Bentham, Works of Jeremy Bentham (Bowring edn), vol 2, (Edinburgh, William 
Tait, 1843), 402.  
93 Ibid.  
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exercised, as it were, by the aggregate body of the dead.’94 Who, after all, can make the dead 
tyrant revoke his law? Consequently, all religion, including that represented by the Bible, 
must be swept away by science for:   
In knowledge in general, and in knowledge belonging to the physical department in 
particular, will the vast mass of mischief, of which perverted religion is the source, 
find its preventive remedy.95 
 
Bentham’s opposition to biblical law is partly grounded in the fact it is a source of irrevocable 
law located in antiquity.96 If it is bad enough to be led by laws that are a century out of date, 
how much worse it is to submit to those that are several thousand years old.  
Here, too, Bentham’s view is recognizably modern, anticipating what we could call 
the neophiliac challenge to biblical law. We belittle it simply because it is old.97 However, we 
may question the strength of this position. It may be easy to assume that subjects such as 
medicine and the natural sciences are far more sophisticated than they were three or four 
thousand years ago; however, the same reasoning does not apply when carried over to other 
fields of human endeavour, such as law. We cannot assume, per Bentham, that ‘new law’ is 
always ‘best’; that antiquity is a disqualification when it comes to legal reasoning and that the 
past has nothing to do with today. The reverse, in fact, is as likely to be true. For example, the 
political philosophy of Deuteronomy was so far ahead of its time that we do not find anything 
approaching the sort of programme it prescribes until the American founding fathers.98 Nor 
should we underestimate the intellectual or the literary powers of people in biblical society.99 
Scholars have indeed found in the biblical laws and judgments a level of insight that has 
rarely, if ever, been surpassed.100 As we have seen, Bentham himself admires the effective 
                                                 
94 Ibid, [402]-[403].  
95 Jeremy Bentham, Works of Jeremy Bentham (Bowring edn), vol 8, (Edinburgh, William 
Tait, 1843), 13.  
96 As noted in n XX, above, Austin, is less radical than Bentham on this point since he does 
assert the genuine, independent, authority of divine law.   
97 Brent A Strawn, The Old Testament Is Dying (Grand Rapids, Baker Academic, 2017) for a 
sophisticated assessment.  
98 Berman, Created Equal, ch 2, Bernard Levinson, ‘The First Constitution: Rethinking the 
origins of rule of law and separation of powers in the light of Deuteronomy’ (2006) 27 
Cardozo L Rev 1853.  
99 Eg Shimon Bar-Efrat, Narrative Art in the Bible (Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press, 
1989); Yehuda T Radday, ‘Chiasmus in Hebrew Biblical Narrative,’ in John W Welch (ed) 
Chiasmus in Antiquity (Research Press, Provo 1981) 50; Wilfred G E Watson, ‘Chiastic 
Patterns in Biblical Hebrew Poetry’ in Welch, Chiasmus, 118.   
100 Eg Jubilee Manifesto, Michael Schluter and John Ashcroft (eds) (Leicester, Inter-Varsity 
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promulgation of biblical law and its commitment to transparent justice at the city gates.101 Yet 
Bentham does not tarry to explore the biblical texts or find other ways in which they are 
sound, wise or practical.102  
 
B   The Materialist Challenge   
 
Second, Bentham’s antagonism towards biblical law is consistent with his well-documented 
prejudice against organised religion. Indeed, Bentham anticipates Feuerbach’s The Essence of 
Christianity by several generations when he asserts that:   
It is not from the attributes of the Deity, that an idea is to be had of any qualities in 
men: on the contrary, it is from what we see of the qualities of men, that we obtain the 
feeble idea we can frame to ourselves, of the attributes of the Deity.103  
 
It is consistent with Bentham’s materialist worldview.104 Bentham was especially opposed to 
the Church of England and recommended its ‘euthanasia.’105 He was determined to undermine 
                                                 
101 Jeremy Bentham, Works of Jeremy Bentham (Bowring edn), vol 5, (Edinburgh, William 
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God (see Schofield, ‘Political and religious radicalism’, 272). Despite this materialism, even 
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should not carry not much weight when the evidence pulling us in a different direction is so 
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105 James E Crimmins and Catherine Fuller (eds), The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham: 
Church-of-Englandism and its Catechism Examined (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), 
Appendix No IV. For an account of Bentham’s conflict with the established Church, see 
Schofield, Utility and Democracy, 171-198; James E Crimmins, Secular Utilitarianism: 
Social Science and the Critique of Religion in the Thought of Jeremy Bentham (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1990) 183-201 and Philip Schofield, ‘Political and Religious 
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what he called ‘Revealed Religion’, including ‘the religion of Jesus in particular.’106  His 
declaration that ‘God’s will could not provide a standard for temporal happiness...’107 clears 
the way for his utilitarian political agenda. All this is consistent with his attack on the Bible 
and the authority of biblical law. 
 
C   The Secular Challenge   
 
Third, Bentham’s reasons for opposing the authority of biblical law are consistent with his 
overall objective, namely, ‘to shew how absolutely unserviceable and indeed disserviceable 
the idea of God is for the purpose of solving any political problem….’108 The ‘Will of God’ as 
disclosed in the Bible cannot be used to determine what is politically right or wrong. Bentham 
warns of: ‘the inextricable difficulties in which those involve themselves who think to blend 
together things so dissevered as politics and theology and who propose to try the propriety of 
a political regulation by any other test than by that plain and luminous one, the principle of 
utility.’109  It follows from this that if biblical law cannot be used to motivate conformity to 
the principle of utility, then it must be excluded from the public square:   
To act consistently they [proponents of biblical law] must take their choice—they 
must be either Legislators altogether or Divines altogether. They cannot be both at 
once. When in the Senate, they must either shut up their Bible or their Statute book. 
They must either give up the notion of drawing arguments from the scriptures; or that 
of directing their measures to the temporal felicity of the State.110  
 
Just as Bentham’s philosophy of law has shaped, however indirectly, our 
understanding of biblical law, so Bentham’s broader philosophy has shaped our understanding 
of the role that biblical law can be allowed to play to public life. His view has become our 
default view. His absolute exclusion of the Bible as a source of authority from the public 
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square, and his complete prohibition of any biblical critique of modern law, chime with the 
easy-going assumptions of post-Enlightenment western thought. This is not surprising; 
Bentham helped to shape them. Similarly, Bentham’s admittance of biblical law only to the 
extent that it supports utility anticipates, for example, Habermas’ prevailing view that, for 
religious ideas to be admitted into the public square, a means must be found of ‘translating’ 
them into a form suitable to function as authoritative political reasons in lawmaking.111 The 
split-level Enlightenment philosophy that assigns religion and politics to separate spheres 
defines our age, and is embraced as enthusiastically within the church and as outside it. 
Bentham’s position suits all sides very well: it lets the church off the hook from having to 
engage or confront the wider culture and leaves political leaders free to do whatever they like 
without appeal to higher authority.  
There may be several additional reasons why Bentham’s philosophy has shaped our 
understanding both of biblical law and its place in modern society. One reason, I suggest, is 
that we actively want a secular understanding of biblical law. We want to demystify divine 
law so that we can make it into what we want it to be.112 Bentham, par excellence, provides us 
with the tools for a secularized reading of biblical law. This is reflected in his secular 
definition of biblical law and his secular exposition of its (lack of) authority. Another reason 
is that, throughout, Bentham’s motivation is to present law in such a way as to enable external 
critique. His definition allows us to distance ourselves from law, the better so we can stand in 
judgement on it. This is part of the positivist mindset, and understandably so. It is because law 
is heteronomous and imposes major constraints and obligations upon us that it must always be 
subject to external critique. Again, it is plausible to suggest that a further reason why a 
Benthamite understanding of law is the default in biblical scholarship is because we want to 
keep biblical law ‘at a distance’, the better to pass judgment upon it. In this respect, critical 
biblical scholars may be said to work with an implicit positivist stance. This too is part of 
Bentham’s legacy. 
 
D   The Secular Prophet and his Secular Torah 
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Bentham’s opposition to the authority of biblical law is consistent with his prior ideological 
commitment to the principle of utility. Indeed, the following declaration is made precisely in 
the context of discussing biblical law: 
The principle of utility once adopted as the governing principle, admits of no rival, 
admits not even of an associate. 113  
 
The idea that the Bible constitutes a rival worldview may explain an unusual feature of 
Bentham’s writings, and to which I here draw attention, namely, the way in which Bentham 
repeatedly presents his idea of a legal code (the Pannomium) in terms that are redolent of 
torah.114 This suggestion gains plausibility in the light of Bentham’s earlier engagement with, 
and knowledge of, biblical law. Thus Bentham says in his A General View of a Complete 
Code of Laws that: ‘The father of a family, without assistance, might take it [the code] in his 
hand and teach it to his children, and give to the precepts of private morality the force and 
dignity of public morals.’115 The imagery evokes the classic exhortation to teach Torah in the 
home: 
You shall teach them diligently to your children, and shall talk of them when you sit in 
your house, and when you walk by the way, and when you lie down, and when you 
rise. You shall bind them as a sign on your hand…. (Deuteronomy 6:7-8). 
 
In context, the importance of this verse lies in the fact that the covenant is consecrated 
with each member of Israel, which means that every single person is responsible for its 
faithful implementation. 116  Private and public morality—in Bentham’s terms—are indeed 
linked. This could, of course, be coincidental; the Bible does not have a monopoly on the 
merits of parental instruction. However, we have already noted that Bentham commends 
biblical law in part because of its effective promulgation; since this is a key aspect of its 
dissemination, Bentham can hardly have been unaware of it.  
Bentham also thinks that ‘under any one Government should any such rationalized 
body of law, to any considerable extent be established, it will form an era in the history of 
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Governments. It will be an example to all nations.’117  This claim resonates with another 
famous text in Deuteronomy where Israel’s observance of the law is explicitly to serve as an 
example to the nations: 
Keep them and do them, for that will be your wisdom and your understanding in the 
sight of the peoples, who, when they hear all these statutes, will say, ‘Surely this great 
nation is a wise and understanding people.’ (Deuteronomy 4:6) 
 
Not for nothing do Schofield and Harris title one volume of Bentham’s writings, on law and 
codification, Legislator of the World.118  
Is it going too far to suggest that Bentham wants his Pannomium to have the status of 
a secular Torah? Lest this seem fanciful we should remind ourselves that, when Bentham 
authored an explicit attack on the writings of the Apostle Paul in the New Testament, he did 
so under the name of ‘Gamaliel Smith.’119 The choice of pseudonym is hardly accidental. The 
juxtaposition of the Jewish name ‘Gamaliel’ with the common English surname ‘Smith’ 
suggests Bentham saw himself as the English equivalent of the distinguished rabbi Gamaliel 
from the Second Temple period and who is mentioned in the New Testament. Is this the 
unrecognized Bentham—the secular rabbi advancing a secular Torah?  
Perhaps not a mere rabbi, either. Bentham himself describes a dream he had around 
1780: 
‘I dreamt t’other-night that I was a founder of a sect: of course a personage of great 
sanctity and importance. It was called the sect of utilitarians’120 (emphasis original).  
 
It is Bentham who casts himself in holy language as being of ‘great sanctity’—the 
high priest who instructs his disciples in the sacred path of utility. Baumgardt notes it is the 
first time the term ‘utilitarianism’ appears in Bentham.121 If so, it is all the more telling that 
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Bentham’s ‘scientific’ project is birthed in such a religious context. The same dream-notes 
describe how, as Bentham was musing one night, an angel flew in through his window and  
put into my hands a book which he said he had just been writing… it was lettered on 
the back Principles of Legislation… all I had to do was to cram it as well as I could 
down the throats of other people: (they would it had the true flavour of the fruit of the 
tree of knowledge of good and evil).122  
 
Bentham here makes a connection between his seminal text (An Introduction to the Principles 
of Morals and Legislation) and the ‘forbidden fruit’ of the Garden of Eden; the taking and the 
eating of which expel Adam and Eve from the presence of God. As far as Bentham’s own 
subconscious is concerned, his work symbolizes rebellion against God. But whereas Adam 
and Eve voluntarily choose to take and eat of the fruit, Bentham sees it as his role to force-
feed it to others.  
He continues immediately with the remarkable reflection: 
One day as I was musing over this book there came out to me crying a great man 
named LS [Baumgardt proposes Bentham’s mentor Lord Shelburne123] and he said 
unto me [:] what shall I do to be saved? I had forgot continued he: I must not talk of 
myself—I mean to save the nation? I said unto him: take up my book and follow 
me.124  
 
The cry of the jailer in Acts 16:30 becomes the cry of the nation, addressed not now to the 
apostle Paul but to Bentham. However, Bentham himself is now no longer a mere apostle or 
‘messenger’ of the angel but sees himself as Messiah. Later, he even describes ‘LS’ as ‘my 
apostle.’125 Bentham evokes the first Adam and the last Adam. He has come to save the 
nation, but whereas Jesus summoned his followers to take up their cross (Matthew 16:24), 
Bentham bathetically offers his book. His mystical account goes on to describe an encounter 
with ‘a man named George’ (whom Baumgardt plausibly takes to refer to King George III126) 
who eats a page of the book; whereupon ‘there fell the scales from his eyes and not seeing 
what better he could do with himself, he also followed us.’127  Here, Bentham draws upon the 
prophet Ezekiel consuming the divine scroll (Ezekiel 3:1-2) and Paul’s miraculous healing 
(Acts 9:17). Finally, Bentham describes meeting a weak and pale ‘Britannia’ who ‘had an 
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issue of blood upon her for many years.’128 Needless to say, on encountering Bentham: ‘She 
started up fresher, faster and more alive than ever….’129 This pointedly recalls the woman in 
Mark’s Gospel who had suffered ‘a discharge of blood for twelve years’ (Mark 5:25) and who 
is healed by the merest touch of Jesus’ garments (Mark 5:27-30). 
Bentham casts himself in the starring role of a meta-biblical dramatis. When he is not 
a counterfeit Jesus, he is a secular Moses. Away from dream-notes, he closes his argument in 
Essay on the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation with an explicitly biblical 
metaphor. Utility presents humankind with the idea of ‘a perfect system of legislation’ 
according to which a person   
may trace the whole of its horizon and though no one now living may be permitted to 
enter this land of promise, yet he who shall contemplate it in its vastness and its beauty 
may rejoice, as did Moses, when, on the verge of the desert, from the mountain top, he 
saw the length and breadth of the good land into which he was not permitted to enter 
and take possession.130   
  
Whatever significance we attach to his words, it seems that even as Bentham seeks to 
undermine the authority of biblical law, he cannot help but ape its language and aspirations.  
It would, in closing, be consistent with the Benthamite spirit of modernity to be a little 
psychological regarding Bentham’s handling of biblical law. After all, the ferocity of his 
response raises the question: where does this vitriol come from? At one level, we might see it 
as the passion of a reformer who is protesting against the injustice caused by vested interests 
controlling a conservative legal system. But this does not explain Bentham’s anger against 
Torah, nor does it account for the emotional force with which he presents his argument. It is 
not as though there were large numbers of ‘biblical lawyers’ or theonomists surrounding 
Bentham or trying to gain control of England in the eighteenth century. It is not a real agenda 
and when Bentham claims that not even the Church is interested in biblical law, he admits as 
much. So we ask again: why the hostility? I suggest that Bentham saw a parallel between his 
concept of law as an imaginative construct and the nature and character of Torah; so close to 
Bentham’s own ambitions in terms of its particularity, its impact and its universal sway, yet in 
its divinity so very different from what he wanted. Perhaps what made Bentham so angry 
about Torah is that he saw in it so much of what he wanted to achieve himself. At root, his 
rejection of biblical law is because he wanted Bentham, not God, to be god.  
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VI    CONCLUSION 
 
Bentham’s treatment of biblical law is flawed throughout. First, he forces biblical law onto 
the Procrustean bed of his legal philosophy. Second, he consistently misreads and 
misrepresents the biblical texts, both on their own terms and in regard to innate modes of 
Jewish and Christian reception and appropriation. Finally, he rejects the authority of biblical 
law because it rivals his ideals of modernity, secularity and utility. Yet despite their pervasive 
influence, Bentham’s ideas concerning biblical law are well past their sell-by date. It is time 
to challenge his prejudices and recognize the paucity of his arguments. We need to jolt 
ourselves out of familiar, but misleading, assumptions about biblical law. Instead, we must 
pursue a revitalized understanding that is shaped, at point after point, by the covenant 
narrative of Israel and an essentially Jewish perception of reality—which in turn requires us to 
re-evaluate the place of biblical law in the modern public square. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
